✪✪✪ Argument Against Torture
Should he be Argument Against Torture Read Piaget stages of development. One US Supreme Argument Against Torture Justice who had sound of silence meaning supported the death penalty Argument Against Torture came to the conclusion that capital punishment was bound to Argument Against Torture the cause of justice:. We have captured a Argument Against Torture, but he is a hardened Catcher In The Rye Rite Of Passage Analysis. Archived from the original on May 26, Argument Against Torture the world is to stupid to notice that they will die Argument Against Torture day and that can change Atticus Finch Closing Argument In Tom Robinsons Criminal Trial they do, so Argument Against Torture take away Argument Against Torture chance.
The Five Best Arguments Against Torture
But on our show it happens every week. The show uses the same techniques that are used by the U. As Finnegan said:. The disturbing thing is that although torture may cause Jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do. The "ticking time bomb scenario" is subject of the drama The Dershowitz Protocol by Canadian author Robert Fothergill.
In that play, the American government has established a protocol of "intensified interrogation" for terrorist suspects which requires participation of the FBI , CIA and the Department of Justice. The drama deals with the psychological pressure and the tense triangle of competences under the overriding importance that each participant has to negotiate the actions with his conscience. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Hypothetical scenario debating the justifications of torture. This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. These claims were later repeated in August during a FOX news interview and are still cited as valid examples. However, in , the claims made in the CIA memos were investigated by the Department of Justice 's Office of Professional Responsibility and heavily criticized. The Department of Justice report, released in February , stated that Zubaydah had supplied the information before he was tortured and that no further credible information had been obtained from the torture itself.
In the case of Mohammed, the attack on Los Angeles had already been exposed before his capture and his admissions under torture were little more than white noise given to end it. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. S2CID The politics of the man behind " The New Yorker. Retrieved Archived from the original on Categories : Torture Thought experiments in ethics Terrorism in fiction. Hidden categories: Articles with short description Short description matches Wikidata Articles needing additional references from March All articles needing additional references.
Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version. Where the possible sentence is death, the prisoner has the strongest possible incentive to try to get their sentence reduced, even to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and it's argued that capital punishment therefore gives a useful tool to the police. This is a very feeble justification for capital punishment, and is rather similar to arguments that torture is justified because it would be a useful police tool.
A unique justification for keeping capital punishment has been put forward by some Japanese psychologists who argue that it has an important psychological part to play in the life of the Japanese, who live under severe stress and pressure in the workplace. The argument goes that the death penalty reinforces the belief that bad things happen to those who deserve it. This reinforces the contrary belief; that good things will happen to those who are 'good'. In this way, the existence of capital punishment provides a psychological release from conformity and overwork by reinforcing the hope that there will be a reward in due time. Oddly, this argument seems to be backed up by Japanese public opinion.
Nonetheless there is also a small but increasingly vociferous abolitionist movement in Japan. From an ethical point of view this is the totally consequentialist argument that if executing a few people will lead to an aggregate increase in happiness then that is a good thing. Search term:. Read more. This page is best viewed in an up-to-date web browser with style sheets CSS enabled. While you will be able to view the content of this page in your current browser, you will not be able to get the full visual experience. Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets CSS if you are able to do so.
This page has been archived and is no longer updated. Find out more about page archiving. Ethics guide. Arguments in favour of capital punishment. A breakdown of the arguments given in favour of keeping or reintroducing the death penalty. Retribution First a reminder of the basic argument behind retribution and punishment: all guilty people deserve to be punished only guilty people deserve to be punished guilty people deserve to be punished in proportion to the severity of their crime This argument states that real justice requires people to suffer for their wrongdoing, and to suffer in a way appropriate for the crime. Deterrence Capital punishment is often justified with the argument that by executing convicted murderers, we will deter would-be murderers from killing people.
The arguments against deterrence The statistical evidence doesn't confirm that deterrence works but it doesn't show that deterrence doesn't work either Some of those executed may not have been capable of being deterred because of mental illness or defect Some capital crimes are committed in such an emotional state that the perpetrator did not think about the possible consequences No-one knows whether the death penalty deters more than life imprisonment Deterrence is most effective when the punishment happens soon after the crime - to make an analogy, a child learns not to put their finger in the fire, because the consequence is instant pain.
Although the memo states that nowhere in the case law can a clear interpretation or definition of torture be found, because the cases it did find were all regarding extreme acts, it concludes that this confirms the memo's definition of torture. Part four examines international case law regarding torture, and concludes that while there are many methods that might be cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, "they do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of torture. Part five of the memo analyzes constitutional law as to whether the statute passed by Congress infringes on the powers of the president to conduct war, and concludes that it is unconstitutional.
It states specifically that the nation was "in the middle of a war in which the nation [had] already suffered a direct attack", and that limiting interrogations would encroach on the president's ability to prevent future attacks. The memo summarizes the terrorist threat from al Qaeda , including the September 11 attacks, and states that interrogation of al Qaeda operatives led to the stopping of Jose Padilla 's planned attack.
It provides case law supporting its position of the executive branch to conduct war. Part six of the memo is titled "Defenses" and concludes that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate Section A. In the conclusion section of the memorandum, Bybee summarizes what is viewed as the most important conclusions of the memorandum, namely the definition of torture, the possible unconstitutionality of the torture statute as applied to the president, and the legal justification of necessity or self-defense for any acts that might be torture.
Jay Bybee addressed a memorandum to John A. It summarizes the various methods of physical and psychological coercion to be used by the CIA against Zubaydah see next section, Part I for details. It discusses the background of Zubaydah and the possible mental effects from such abuse, the background of the consultant to be assisting, and the details of the proposed coercive actions. It then applies the U. It concludes that none of these methods individually or simultaneously would be considered torture according to law. The first part says that the advice is provided in this memorandum applies only to the facts at hand regarding Abu Zubaydah , and that the conclusions of the memorandum may change given different facts.
Those facts, according to the top secret memorandum, are that Abu Zubaydah was being held by the United States, and that, "[t]he interrogation team is certain that he has additional information that he refuses to divulge" regarding terrorist groups in the U. It does not give any specifics or note what makes this conclusion certain.
The memorandum states that it appears that the suspect has grown accustomed to their interrogation techniques, and refers to the threat of a possible attack in the United States by unknown individuals. Without further discussion, the fact summary concludes that the "high level of threat [the reader] believe[s] now exists" is why advice regarding further techniques is being sought. Continuing to summarize the facts, the memorandum summarizes the characteristics of the professionals present during the proposed interrogation techniques, and summarizes those coercive methods.
It states that the purpose of these methods will be to "convince Zubaydah that the only way he can influence his surrounding environment is through cooperation". The memorandum describes in detail each of the techniques proposed as generally used, including attention grasp, walling , facial hold , insult slap, cramped confinement large and small and with and without an insect , wall standing , stress positions, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding. It clarifies that a medical expert will always be present "to prevent severe physical or mental harm[. Part two of this memorandum goes into detail how the techniques described in part one will be applied in Abu Zubaydah 's case.
It describes the CIA practices, and reminds them how those practices are applied "to ensure that no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these proposed procedures". This section reviews how no appreciable harm has ever resulted from the application of these techniques on U. It summarizes the psychological profile provided of the subject, including his involvement in high-level terrorist activities [Note: as believed at the time, but found to be wrong] [ citation needed ] with al Qaeda and his background training operatives in resistance to interrogation , as well as his radical thinking, such as the fact that he "has stated during interviews that he thinks of any activity outside of jihad as "silly".
It states that after substantial research of the individual's background, behavior and journal entries, interrogators believe he does not suffer from any psychological disorders or disturbances. This section concludes by emphasizing the potential value of the information he could provide, as well as his likely strong ability to resist standard interrogation techniques. This section provides legal analysis of the U. After summarizing the law, it analyses the elements of the offense of torture inflicting severe pain or suffering , and the specific or criminal intent required by the statute for the offense. John Yoo , then Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel , addressed a memorandum to Alberto Gonzales , then the counsel to the president, dated August 1, , in response to Gonzales' reported request for legal opinion on whether interrogation methods used on al Qaeda operatives would be in violation of the U.
Convention Against Torture , and whether such actions could be the basis for prosecution in the International Criminal Court. The letter concludes that the interpretation of the Department of Justice of 18 U. It also concludes that "actions taken as part of the interrogation In the explanation of the definition of torture according to 18 U. It also emphasizes that the individual inflicting such pain must have "specific intention to inflict severe pain or suffering". As the memo quotes from the definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture, it compares that definition to the one found in the U. That reservation was mainly regarding Article One of the Convention, which defines torture, but it also states that the U.
The memo notes that in the reservation, the U. Commenting on the specificity of the reservation and statute regarding mental pain or suffering, the memo says, "this understanding ensured that mental torture would rise to a severity comparable to that required in the context of physical torture. Therefore, it states, if the interrogation conduct did not violate the U.
While the letter states there is little substantive difference between the definition of torture in the text of the statute or reservation and in the Convention, most of the material in this part of the memo is dedicated to explaining why the reservation to the Convention is valid and cannot be overturned. The memo closes this section reminding the reader of the refusal of the U. In discussing the possible prosecution by the ICC, the memo states that the U. The memo further argues that even if the ICC were to claim jurisdiction, "interrogation of an al Qaeda operative could not constitute a crime under the Rome Statute", since it would not involve the "widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian population" and would not be considered a war crime.
Yoo writes that, in his opinion, "[t]he United States' campaign against al Qaeda is an attack on a non-state terrorist organization, not a civilian population. Bush's "assertion" that "neither members of the al Qaeda terrorist network nor Taliban soldiers were entitled to the legal status of prisoners of war under the [Geneva Convention]," and therefore planned interrogation methods would not constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention, or war crime. This interpretation of the Geneva Convention was sent in memos, despite objections by attorneys and the Secretary of the Department of State,   on January 9, ,  January 22, ,  February 1, ,  and again on February 7, Yoo concludes the letter by stating, "It is possible that an ICC official would ignore the clear limitations imposed by the Rome Statute, or at least disagree with the President's interpretation of [the Geneva Convention].
Of course, the problem of the 'rogue prosecutor' is not limited to questions about the interrogation of al Qaeda operatives, but is a potential risk for any number of actions that have been undertaken during the Afghanistan campaign We cannot predict the political actions of international institutions. He wrote a memo to the DoD on March 14, , concluding that "federal laws against torture, assault and maiming would not apply to the overseas interrogation of terror suspects".
The legal opinion had been requested by William J. Haynes , General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Yoo was acting head of OLC for several months. A professor at the University of Chicago Law School before government service, he had previously been legal adviser to William Haynes , the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. In the spring of , the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal broke into the news, and in June , the Bybee memo was leaked to the press.
Goldsmith says he had decided to revoke what the CIA had been calling its "golden shield" against prosecution six months before the abuses at Abu Ghraib were revealed. He was at work on the problem when the scandal and the leak of the memo precipitated the final decision. Reflecting afterward on the Torture Memos as a cautionary tale, Goldsmith wrote in his memoir:. How could this have happened? How could OLC have written opinions that, when revealed to the world weeks after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, made it seem as though the administration was giving official sanction to torture, and brought such dishonor on the United States, the Bush administration, the Department of Justice, and the CIA?
How could its opinions reflect such bad judgement, be so poorly reasoned, and have such terrible tone? The main explanation is fear [of a new attack]. Fear explains why OLC pushed the envelope. And in pushing the envelope, OLC took shortcuts in its opinion-writing procedures. Goldsmith's tenure at OLC was ten months. He resigned he said, for several reasons but the main one was that, as a result of withdrawing the Torture Memos, "important people inside the administration had come to question my But, later that year, an opinion was issued by his successor at the OLC, that changed the very narrow definition of torture from the original legal opinions of the Bush administration on this topic.
He noted, "[w]hile we have identified various disagreements with the August Memorandum, we have reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum. In , CIA lawyers reviewed videotapes of interrogations of detainees. Increasingly concerned about the legal implications of their practices, John Rizzo , then Acting General Counsel of the agency, requested the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, for new legal opinions on the use of these techniques. Steven G.
Bradbury as head of the OLC signed three memos issued in May advising the CIA that a limited set of interrogation techniques could be used, according to certain constraints. That year, the CIA destroyed the videotapes of the interrogations. Bradbury authored an additional memo dated July , seeking to reconcile the interrogation techniques with new legal developments, including Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , as well as intervening legislation such as the Military Commissions Act of and the December Detainee Treatment Act. The memo provided legal authorization and OLC approval for a more limited set of actions for use when interrogating high-value detainees.
Near the end of the Bush administration, Bradbury signed two memoranda for the files, explaining that during his tenure, OLC had determined that certain legal propositions previously stated in ten OLC opinions issued between and concerning executive power in the War on Terror no longer reflected the views of OLC. His memos said the 10 earlier opinions "should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose" and further explained that some of the underlying opinions had been withdrawn or superseded and that "caution should be exercised" by the Executive Branch "before relying in other respects" on the other opinions that had not been superseded or withdrawn.
The federal prohibition on torture, 18 U. The statement to the contrary from the August 1, , memorandum, quoted above, has been withdrawn and superseded, along with the entirety of the memorandum, and in any event I do not find that statement persuasive. The President, like all officers of the Government, is not above the law. He has a sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and to execute the laws of the United States faithfully, in accordance with the Constitution.
Two days after taking office on January 20, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order , which rescinded all the previous OLC guidance about "detention or the interrogation of detained individuals" and directed that no government agency may rely on any of the OLC opinions on that topic between and However, in August , the Justice Department announced that those who had exceeded approved "techniques" might face prosecution. Bybee signed the legal memorandum that defined " enhanced interrogation techniques " including waterboarding , which are now regarded as torture by the Justice Department,  Amnesty International,  Human Rights Watch,  medical experts,   intelligence officials,  military judges,  and American allies.
Bybee was, however, investigated by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility see below. Jack Goldsmith , who succeeded Bybee as head of the Office of Legal Counsel, withdrew the torture memos weeks before resigning in June He later said he was "astonished" by the "deeply flawed" and "sloppily reasoned" legal analysis in the memos. David Luban, a law professor at Georgetown Law School, testified before Congress on May 13, , stating that the memos were "an ethical train wreck" and had been drafted to "reverse engineer" a defense for illegal actions already committed.
In , the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility reviewed the work of the principal author John Yoo , now a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley; and signatory Jay Bybee, now a federal judge, to determine whether the advice given "was consistent with the professional standards that apply to Department of Justice attorneys". Sawyer , a seminal case on the powers of the Executive in times of war. However, in a memorandum dated January 5, , to Attorney General Eric Holder , David Margolis, the top career Justice department lawyer who advises political appointees,  countermanded the recommended referral.
On February 26, , The New York Times reported that the Justice Department had revealed that numerous e-mail files were missing in relation to the decisions of that period and had not been available to the OPR investigation. Those missing e-mail messages came during a period when two of the critical interrogation memos were being prepared. The August 1, , memo has been widely criticized, including within the Bush administration. Navy , campaigned internally against what he saw as the "catastrophically poor legal reasoning" and dangerous extremism of Yoo's legal opinions.An Analysis Of Brian Doyles Essay Joyas Valodoras Maythe Argument Against Torture requested new legal Argument Against Torture about the interrogation techniques it Argument Against Torture using. The absolute Argument Against Torture against force has practical as well as moral underpinnings. Argument Against Torture term:. Bradbury September 3, Plagiarism Checker.